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Explaining, interpreting, and prescribing: some tensions and dilemmas in 






This chapter reflects on the implications of a cross-cultural empirical 
research study on youth justice in Italy and Wales for transnational 
prescription of good practice. It examines the challenges in doing 
comparative studies which isolate the influence of particular 
elements of criminal justice regimes. Such analysis may seem well 
suited to transnational policy prescription in that particular elements 
are more easily transposed than whole systems. But institutional 
categories and practice may be so culturally imbedded that it 
becomes very difficult to understand their influence outside those 
particular cultural contexts. The article goes on to examine the 
potential (and the limitations) for transnational policy prescription of 
more holistic interpretive approaches to explanation rooted in 
analysis of legal cultures. It concludes that such approaches can 
expand the range of possible policy choices in terms of 
transnational prescription but cannot offer a means to predict their 






Comparative research often identifies and highlights cross-cultural 
diversity in social and legal practices and norms. It is that very diversity 
that often seems to open up the possibility of doing things differently. But 
if the way we think and act in matters of security and justice is defined by 
varying local cultures, then this may raise questions about the feasibility 
of effective transfer out of a specific cultural context and even perhaps its 
desirability. This article reflects on the experience of conducting an 
empirical research study which, relying on interviews and matched case-
file samples, sought to compare youth justice practice in Wales 
(specifically South Wales) and Italy (with a focus on Emilia Romagna).1 It 
                                                     
1 The study was led by myself and Professor David Nelken and funded by the Economic 
and Social Research Council in the United Kingdom (Reference number R000239418) 
and by the Ministry for the Universities in Italy. 
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argues that our capacity to evaluate and prescribe policy and practice 
cross-culturally on the basis of comparative studies is influenced by the 
research strategies and methods adopted. In particular, it examines the 
challenges, difficulties and implications of two different ways of 
approaching such research: first, a conventional social science research 
strategy seeking to explain difference by isolating key variables for 
comparison and secondly, a more holistic interpretive approach organised 
around the concept of legal cultures.  
The argument proceeds in four steps. First, some preliminary 
remarks about the relationship between purposes, methods and concepts 
in cross-cultural research which draw on arguments first made by my co-
researcher Professor David Nelken. Secondly, an outline of how we 
constructed the study. This emphasizes the difficulties of finding valid 
cross-cultural anchoring points on which to pin an analysis of particular 
elements and variables within each system as might be required by more 
traditional positivist social science approaches. Thirdly, an explanation of 
the interpretive cultural approach that we adopted with its insights and 
the limits to those insights. Lastly, an exploration of the implications for 
cross-cultural evaluation and policy prescription. 
 
PURPOSES, METHODS AND CONCEPTS IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 
 
David Nelken has argued the need for more explicit examination of the 
significance of the different underlying objectives of comparative 
research.2 In particular, he has called for examination of how different 
purposes impact on the way that comparative research is conducted, how 
data is interpreted and presented and (policy) conclusions are drawn or 
not drawn. He identifies five such purposes: describing, classifying, 
explaining, interpreting and evaluating.3 In this article, I want to focus on 
the interrelationship between explaining and interpreting and their 
implications for evaluation. Nelken distinguishes explanations constructed 
in terms of causal relations between discrete objective factors and those 
constructed as holistic interpretive accounts.4 The former (associated with 
a certain traditional social science often termed positivist) seeks to 
formulate and test explanatory hypotheses about causal relationships that 
will hold good across cultures and social contexts. For example, one might 
make an attempt to establish generalizable propositions that are valid 
                                                     
2 D Nelken, Comparative criminal justice: making sense of difference (2010) 
3 Id., passim but especially chapter 1 
4 Id., chapter 3 
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across jurisdictions about the consequences of earlier or later intervention 
in youth justice. Once causal variables shaping the consequences of 
interventions have been identified, one can predict their effect in specified 
circumstances. This seems to offer the prospect of establishing ‘scientific’ 
propositions and ‘scientific’ truths about ‘what works’ and thus a direct 
and clear route from comparative explanation to transnational 
prescription. But Nelken points out such studies require ‘some sort of 
common denominator of meaning’5 for the key dependent variables (such 
as youth crime rates, penal intervention, conviction or diversion, custody 
rates). It is these very questions of cultural meaning which become the 
central concern of comparative research in which interpretation is the key 
research strategy. The challenge here is to understand the 
interrelationship between explaining and interpreting as strategies for 
comparative research that might inform cross-cultural policy prescription. 
What if one consequence of a deeper and deeper concern for meaning 
and interpretation in cross-cultural research is that many categories of 
different criminal justice systems that seem superficially comparable 
become less so? The ‘risk’ (in one sense) is that the deeper one explores 
what categories mean to the actors involved, the greater the opportunity 
to identify hidden cultural specificities and thus cross-cultural differences 
in meaning. That might make the use of traditional positivistic social 
science approaches problematic in circumstances where – on the basis of 
limited cross-cultural interpretive understanding - they may originally 
have seemed viable.  
 
CONSTRUCTING A CASE-STUDY: COMPARATORS AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, David Nelken and I conducted 
empirical research which compared youth justice in Wales and Italy. We 
constructed matched samples of case-files drawn from South Wales and 
Emilia Romagna and supplemented these with interviews done in South 
Wales and Italy of youth justice practitioners (social workers, magistrates 
and police).6 Our decision to compare and our choice of comparator was 
                                                     
5 Id., 42 
6 The interviews were semi-structured and in part informed by discussion of matched 
vignettes of hypothetical cases. For a full exposition of methods and conclusions see S 
Field and D Nelken (2007) ‘Early Intervention and the Cultures of Youth Justice: A 
Comparison of Italy and Wales’ in (eds) V Gessner and D Nelken, European Ways of Law, 
S Field and D Nelken ‘Reading and writing youth justice in Italy and (England and) 
Wales’ (2010) 12 Punishment and Society 287, S Field ‘Finding or Imposing Coherence? 
Comparing national cultures of youth justice’ (2010) 5 Journal of Comparative Law, 
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primarily driven by intellectual curiosity about profound difference: at the 
time, Italy and England and Wales seemed to going off in radically 
different directions in their approach to the role of state intervention 
through the criminal process as a response to youth offending. The British 
Government approach to youth justice had shifted in the early 1990s 
away from the practice of limited intervention that had developed since 
the 1970s. This reversal of policy was entrenched and refined by the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998. This introduced what became known as the 
‘new’ youth justice, overtly based on a strategy of early and progressive 
state intervention through the criminal justice system.7 The reform 
involved limiting the use of informal and formal warnings in relation to 
any one individual. A presumption based on a three-step model was 
introduced: normally a first offence admitted by the young person would 
be treated with an official police reprimand. A second offence would 
usually be met by a police Final Warning, with the possibility in some 
cases that this might involve some (formally voluntary) social 
intervention. But a third offence, where the offender has already received 
a reprimand and Final Warning, would normally be met with prosecution 
and an appearance before the Youth Court. The underpinning rationale 
was that conviction and punishment by the state was a key element in 
‘responsibilizing’ young people.8 In sharp contrast, a revision in 1988 of 
its Code of Juvenile Justice had explicitly entrenched into the Italian legal 
fabric assumptions about the need to limit as much as possible the use of 
punishment. The aims of reform were a little more diverse than that: they 
embraced a concern to promote responsibilization through education 
where necessary. But central importance was placed on the need to limit 
the stigma associated with conviction (and especially custody) and on not 
impeding the normal process of growing up (primarily shaped by 
community and family).9 Professional youth justice magistrates in the 
pre-trial process made extensive use of diversionary filters which meant 
that most young people left the system without conviction or with a 
judicial pardon. These differences in approach between England and 
                                                     
Special Issue on Legal Culture, 216, reprinted in (ed) D Nelken Using legal culture 
(2012) 306. 
7 For good accounts of the ‘new’ youth justice in historical context, see R Smith, Youth 
Justice: Ideas, Policy, Practice (2014, 3rd edn.) ch. 1-3 and DJ Smith (ed.), A New 
Response to Youth Crime (2010). For an empirical account of the practice cultures of the 
new youth justice, see S Field ‘Practice Cultures and the ‘New’ Youth Justice in (England 
and) Wales’ (2007) 47 British Journal of Criminology 311 
8 Home Office (1997) No More Excuses Cmnd. 3809 
9 U Gatti and A Verde, Juvenile Justice in Italy (2016) Oxford Handbooks Online, pp. 5, 
22,https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/abstract/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935383.001.
0001/oxfordhb-9780199935383-e-66?rskey=2TLZkQ, Field, op. cit. (2012) n 6, pp. 314-
5.  
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Wales and Italy seemed to be reflected in very profound differences in 
proportionate use of diversion, conviction and custody. Thus in Italy the 
ratio of young people coming into the youth justice system who were 
dealt with without conviction or by a simple pardon was about 80:20 in 
favour of diversion while during much of the 2000s the equivalent figure 
in England and Wales was more like 40:60.10 In the mid to late 2000s, 
the custody rate for 12-17 year olds in Italy was under 15 per 100,000 
while it was over 70 in England and Wales.11  
Our ‘intellectual curiosity’ about these profound differences was of 
course informed by evaluative and prescriptive considerations. As we 
constructed the study the ‘new’ youth justice in England and Wales was 
being subject to strong critique from academics concerned that it would 
lead to excessive, punitive and socially excluding state intervention.12 A 
number of British academics and third sector actors have pointed to Italy 
as a more tolerant alternative.13 I will return to these prescriptive 
questions in the conclusion after considering some of the issues raised by 
the study itself. 
 We started with two very broad but simple research questions. 
First, did the published national and international statistics mean what 
they seemed to mean – that penal response to juvenile offending was 
systematically more interventionist and punitive in England and Wales 
than in Italy? Secondly, if it was, what were the legal and social factors 
that permitted, encouraged and facilitated such difference? It became 
quickly clear that it would be difficult to conduct comparative quantitative 
analysis of relevant variables using published national or international 
data.  Even answering the most basic question – how much intervention 
is going on in each system – was rendered problematic by a lack of 
comparable categories for measuring intervention. Comparative data 
                                                     
10 For Italy see U Gatti and A Verde, ‘Comparative Juvenile Justice: an overview on Italy’ 
in Juvenile Justice Systems: International Perspectives, ed. J. Winterdyk (2002) 312. For 
England and Wales see http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/statistics/youth-
justice/yjb-annual-workload-data.  For comparative international data, the details of 
which for various reasons must be looked at with some scepticism, but which suggest 
very substantial differences in diversion and conviction rates, see S Malby ‘Juvenile 
Justice and the United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Systems’ in 
Crime and Criminal Justice Systems in Europe and North America 1995-2004, eds K. 
Aromaa and M. Heiskanen 127-132.  
11 See Field and Nelken, op.cit. (2007), n. 7, 349 for details of these calculations. There 
are international comparisons based on slightly different categorisations but with the 
same broad conclusions in N Hazell, Cross-national comparisons of youth justice (2008), 
Table 8.1 and Malby, op.cit., n 10, Table 6.6. 
12 See for example, J Pitts ‘The New Youth Justice and the Politics of Electoral Anxiety’ in 
The New Youth Justice, ed. B Goldson (2000).  
13  For discussion, see D Nelken ‘Understanding and learning from other systems of 
juvenile justice in Europe’ in Juvenile Justice in Europe ed. B Goldson (2019).  
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could be drawn from UN Surveys since the 1980s on trends in crime and 
criminal justice. Italy and England and Wales have both participated in 
some of the sweeps.14 But aside from banal difficulties – they have not 
always participated in the same year – there were more important 
differences. The category for measuring intervention used in the UN data 
was ‘juveniles brought into formal contact with the police and/or criminal 
justice systems per 100,000 young people’. This is a rather vague 
category that might be subject to varying interpretations by different 
jurisdictions providing data. For example, the counting of offences and 
offenders in Italy is built on the category ’offences or offenders notified to 
the Public Prosecutor’, whereas in England and Wales data is collected in 
three different forms (police recorded crime data, Judicial Statistics (court 
data) and Youth Justice Board data). None of these correspond to the 
Italian measurement. Why? In part because notification of offences by the 
police to public prosecutors is a key symbolic cultural moment in Italy 
because it is a jurisdiction founded on the inquisitorial tradition of 
supervision of police by prosecuting magistrates. There is no such 
tradition or reporting practice in England and Wales where local political 
sensitivities about the dangers of a police controlled by the executive 
meant that the institution of Public Prosecutor developed much later and 
without a direct hierarchical relationship between the two.15  We 
rediscovered the truism that the data that is collected by the state and 
how it is categorised is shaped by distinct cultural frames of reference 
(including institutional differences). The dramatic levels of disparity 
between England and Wales and Italy were unlikely to be wholly the 
product of differing ways of measuring contact with the system, but the 
differences in official categories made precise comparisons problematic.  
 That suggested that we needed to construct our own comparable 
samples from both jurisdictions in order to examine possible differences in 
state responses. We constructed a closed case-file sample from South 
Wales to provide a reasonable match with one already existing from 
Emilia Romagna in Italy. The Italian sample was not a random sample of 
all cases coming into the system but of particular types of disposal: half 
were convictions and the other half examples of the three main 
diversionary filters in the Italian system.16 We collected data on key 
                                                     
14 K Aromaa and M Heiskanen (eds) Crime and Criminal Justice Systems in Europe and 
North America 1995-2004 (2008). 
15 C Brants and A Ringnalda, Issues of Convergence: Inquisitorial Prosecution in England 
and Wales? (2010) 32 et seq. 
16 There were 150 Italian cases, 75 of which ended in conviction and 75 of which ended 
in the application of a ‘diversionary filter.’ There were three such filters and we had a 
sample of 25 case-files for each of them. 
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variables17 and made summaries of the case assessments by magistrates 
and social workers. In South Wales we sought to match the existing 
Italian sample, by taking random samples of cases dealt with by each of 
the major forms of disposal in England and Wales: both disposals by 
different sentences and diversionary filters.18 So we used the types of 
legal disposal recognized by each system as the categories organizing our 
case-file collection (seeking to get random samples of each).  
 
SEARCHING FOR COMMON DENOMINATORS OF MEANING 
 
Using categories of domestic law to organize our case-file collection had a 
significant impact on subsequent analysis in that the search for a 
‘common denominator of meaning’ remained challenging. We wanted to 
compare the propensity of the two systems to do three things: to divert 
young people away from criminal justice, to socially intervene through 
criminal process in the community and to imprison. Take the middle 
category, social intervention through criminal process. What kinds of 
cases under the two systems should be examined as examples of this 
kind of intervention? In England and Wales, over the relevant period, any 
significant social intervention that took place would usually occur through 
post-conviction sentences: at the time of case-file collection in 2003, this 
was done through a range of different penal orders with different types of 
intervention with a range of purposes.19 But substantial community social 
intervention primarily occurs in the Italian system through a diversionary 
filter known as messa alla prova (literally ‘putting to the test’). At a 
preliminary hearing (usually) or a final hearing (occasionally) the Youth 
Court may decide to suspend the criminal prosecution for a period of 
supervision by social workers to take place. During this period the young 
person is expected to undergo education or training, follow voluntary or 
activity programmes and accept restrictions such as staying in at night or 
avoiding certain places. If the period is designated as successfully 
                                                     
17 Type and circumstances of offence, the offender’s personal and family background and 
previous record 
18 We sampled 15 of each of the main sentence disposals and 25 of each of the main 
diversionary filters in England and Wales. At the time these were NFAs (where no further 
action is taken), reprimands and final warnings. This produced 235 cases for which 
similar data to that existing from Italy was collected. 
19 The generic term ‘community order’ was used before 2009 to refer to a range of types 
of social intervention, some broadly rehabilitative in their aspirations (action plan orders, 
supervision orders, community rehabilitation orders), some mainly incapacitative or 
punitive (curfew and exclusion orders or community punishment orders) and others 
mixed in their aspirations (attendance centre orders, community punishment and 
rehabilitation orders). In 2009, these orders were replaced by a Youth Rehabilitation 
Order with different requirements corresponding to those interventions.  
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completed – and it may last up to three years in the most serious cases20 
- magistrates will end the prosecution without conviction (and they 
usually do). So the main instrument for social intervention through the 
criminal justice system is ‘diversionary’ in the sense that the young 
person almost always leaves the system without conviction. There is 
hardly any post-conviction social intervention in the Italian youth justice 
system. This is largely because delay is an established element of its legal 
culture.21 Youth justice magistrates cited in interview 2-3 years as the 
normal time period between offence and public hearing.22 Because young 
person arrested at 14 may be very different in their personality, 
aspirations and family contexts when finally sentenced at 16 or 17, it is 
hardly surprising that, if a youth justice system with these levels of delays 
sees a need for intervention, it should prefer action before rather than 
after final public hearing. But that makes messa alla prova as an 
intervention difficult to compare directly with any responses in the system 
in England and Wales: it is neither a good fit for intervention through 
diversion nor intervention through criminal sanction. In Italy, messa alla 
prova is used for more serious offending where social services assess the 
individual to have a good prospect of rehabilitation.23 It can legally be 
imposed for any crime and magistrates, with very few exceptions, felt 
that it could, in the right circumstances, be appropriately imposed even 
for homicide, rape and robbery.24 Its use was regarded as common for 
drugs offences, certain forms of robbery and racketeering and, in some 
places, for rape between minors.25 Messa alla prova would only be used 
for minor offences like theft and handling where it was a third or fourth 
                                                     
20 Eight months (one year is the maximum) is the average time spent on a messa alla 
prova programme for those being dealt with for crimes carrying up to 12 years potential 
prison sentence. One year (three years is the maximum) is the average time spent for 
those sentenced for crimes carrying higher potential prison sentences. 
21 D Nelken, Normalising Time: European integration and court delays in Italy in 
Paradoxes of European Integration, ed. H. Petersen and others (2008). 
22 Int1/TJ, Int2/PTJ. The ‘Int’ coding refers to interviews with further identification based 
on random numbering and function. TJ refers to a trial judge, PTJ to a pre-trial judge, AP 
to an Assistant Prosecutor.  
23 Messa alla prova is used for around 6% or those brought to court: D Nelken, ‘Italian 
Juvenile Justice: A lesson in Tolerance? in Comparative Youth Justice, ed J. Muncie and 
B. Goldson (2006). 
24 Int7/AP. Int8/AP thought homicide and rape were not appropriate crimes for messa 
alla prova. Some prosecutors argued that it should not be used in particular 
circumstances because of their seriousness: one cited the example of a particular case 
where organized crime members had been involved in a string of very serious offences 
including homicide and extortion. But even here there were no absolute prohibitions: it 
might be appropriate to use messa alla prova in relation to some organised crime 
offences. 
25 Int5/TJ, Int3/ChP, Int1/TJ 
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offence.26 That kind of profile – serious offending or repeat offenders - did 
not correspond to those given social intervention through diversionary 
measures in England and Wales at the time. In England and Wales, at the 
time of the study, response to significant offending would move quite 
quickly through a reprimand, then a Final Warning and then conviction 
accompanied by post-conviction intervention. 27 Sometimes a Final 
Warning might lead to a social intervention but where the risk was 
assessed as low that might well be a single one-off meeting with a social 
worker. Even where it was higher, this would usually just imply a single 
further meeting. This is not the kind of substantial extended intervention 
that is envisaged by messa alla prova. So messa alla prova had no 
obvious comparator in England and Wales: its level of intervention 
matched that of post-conviction sanctions but it did not entail a 
conviction; its absence of conviction mirrored Final Warnings but its level 
of intervention was much greater. This reinforces the general impression 
that diversion was an entrenched feature of one system but not the other. 
But it made comparison of particular measures problematic. 
An even more significant problem of establishing comparable 
categories relates to the use in Italy of misure cautelari (provisional or 
precautionary measures): a range of pre-trial measures involving 
increasing degrees of control in the community which were imposed while 
in theory young people were awaiting trial.28 This might involve the 
imposition of prescrizioni: requirements to engage in study or work 
activities for a maximum of two months under the direction of social 
workers. In more serious cases, or where the minor did not respond well, 
it might involve a requirement to stay at home (‘permanenza in casa’). 
This form of ‘house arrest’ might have qualifications – enabling the young 
person to leave the house to work or study – or additional limitations 
preventing communication with certain persons.29 The step beyond that 
would be to send the young person to a (non-secure) community home 
(Comunità di Accoglienza). Sometimes some of these restrictions might 
be justified for the same reasons as bail conditions in England and Wales: 
to prevent flight, further offending or interference with witnesses or 
                                                     
26 Int10/SW. 
27 For details see S. Field 'Early Intervention and the 'New' Youth Justice: A Study of 
Initial Decision-Making' [2008] Criminal Law Review 177. 
28 ‘In theory’ because most would never get to trial. The decisions to impose restrictions 
are made by the Public Prosecutor but then are subject within 48 hours to the 
confirmation of a pre-trial judge known as the ‘judge for preliminary investigations’ 
(Giudice  per le Indagini Preliminari  
29 S Costarelli, ‘Juvenile Justice and Rromani Youths in Italy: The Case of Florence’, in 
Rromani Youths: The Pathways of Juvenile Justice, eds A. Patrignani and R. Villé (1997) 
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evidence.30 But the terms in which they were usually discussed by 
practitioners in interview were more often couched in terms of responses 
to established or presumed offending. This looked like reasoning more 
associated in England and Wales with sentencing decisions at trial than 
with bail decisions. For example, a Prosecutor described himself as being 
very willing to use obligations to attend school or become involved in 
cultural or voluntary work activities as a means of starting the ‘route 
towards rehabilitation’ in relation to routine crime in morally and culturally 
‘deteriorated’ social contexts.31 A trial judge explicitly talked of the 
importance of pre–trial restrictions aimed at educating the young person 
by establishing boundaries.32 Another Prosecutor talked of pre-trial 
control measures as being important to prevent a sense of ‘avoiding 
responsibility’ – a viewpoint that may be understandable if trial is three 
years away.33 Choices between different forms of restriction were made in 
terms of that which would provide the clearest message about the 
seriousness of the offending.34 Furthermore, subsequent decisions would 
be conditioned by the response of the young person to these pre-trial 
measures: a positive response to pre-trial control measures could be used 
later in proceedings as a way of arguing that no further intervention was 
required.. Young people might show they had changed and become aware 
of what they had done while in a community home and thus be given a 
judicial pardon rather than messa alla prova even at the final hearing.35 
Conversely the knowledge that the young person had experienced 
significant pre-trial restrictions on liberty might enable magistrates, in 
more serious cases to choose messa alla prova rather than conviction and 
custody at the final hearing.36  
It was difficult to know what the appropriate comparator for these 
kinds of interventions might be in England and Wales. Decisions about 
appropriate pre-trial measures in Italy seem to be part of an ongoing 
calibration and re-calibration by professional magistrates of the state 
response to offending in the light of the offence, young person’s 
background and his or her response to state intervention. It seems to be 
a form of social intervention through the pre-trial criminal justice process 
that has no direct equivalent in England and Wales where bail decisions 
                                                     





35 Int5/TJ, Int2/PTJ 
36 Int4/PTJ 
 11 
are more narrowly focussed on the particular criteria of the Bail Act.37 The 
formal legal status of the presumption of innocence is no less firmly 
established in Italy than it is in England and Wales.38 But its practical 
significance becomes very different in a system where there is no formal 
guilty plea, where many (perhaps most) young people coming into the 
system will be informally (partially or wholly) admitting guilt, and where 
the pre-trial process might well take three years with 80% of young 
people leaving the system without a conviction.  
Close analysis thus revealed the complexities of finding common 
cross-cultural anchoring points upon which to build close comparison of 
particular measures of social intervention in the community. It was 
difficult to construct a meaning of ‘diversion’ or social intervention 
‘through’ the criminal justice system that had the same validity across 
two systems in which the significance of pre-trial and trial phases seemed 
to be transformed by the very different temporal rhythms of criminal 
justice. The effect of delay in Italy is that surveillance, control and 
treatment – insofar as those responses occur - are primarily aspects of 
the pre-trial youth justice system rather than something that is done after 
formal conviction. In England and Wales in contrast, at the time of our 
study, delay was seen as rendering state intervention ineffective. Formal 
criminal justice sanctions were seen as a vital part of reinforcing a sense 
of personal responsibility and preventing social marginalisation, so 
speeding up trial processes became a key policy goal.39  
Even comparing the use of custody demonstrated difficulties of 
cultural meaning and categorisation. The few cases that get to trial and 
end in convictions in Italy usually lead to custody. But then, provided that 
the custodial sentence is not more than two years, for youths it is very 
likely to be served part-time (semidetenzione) or wholly in the community 
but subject to the control and supervision of the police (libertà 
controllata). So that looks like something that is in whole or in part a 
controlling community measure that is going to be listed as a custodial 
                                                     
37 The key criteria under the Bail Act are focussed on enabling an effective trial by 
preventing flight or interference with witnesses or evidence and preventing  further 
offending before trial: Bail Act 1976: schedule 1, part 1. See generally S Thomas,  
‘Remand Management’ in RHP Companion to Youth Justice, eds  T. Bateman and J. Pitts 
(2005).  
38 The ideological weight of notions of legal due process in Italy (garantismo) is 
signifcant: it reflects a long- run, strongly established fear of the state’s intrusion into 
the lives of citizens that is particularly marked in Italy (See M Pavarini,. The new 
penology and politics in crisis: the Italian case’ (1994) 34 British Journal of Criminology, 
49).    
 
39 Home Office (1997) No More Excuses Cmnd. 3809.  
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sentence. In England and Wales, a custodial sentence almost always 
means an immediate period of full-time detention.40 
 
 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL INTERVENTIONS 
 
We had defined our research interests in terms of comparing specifically 
criminal justice interventions. That in part reflected some of the 
evaluative or prescriptive considerations that fuelled the intellectual 
curiosity behind the research project. It was intensive and progressive 
intervention through the criminal justice process that was seen as having 
particularly damaging consequences for young people in terms of labelling 
stigma and social exclusion.41 From a British perspective, questions about 
intervention through civil justice seemed to raise different issues. But, in 
pursuing the study, we found a further cultural variable: the relationship 
between civil and criminal justice itself. In England and Wales, civil and 
criminal jurisdictions in relation to children and young people have been 
clearly separated since 1989. In Italy, while the two jurisdictions are not 
unified, youth justice prosecutors combine civil and criminal jurisdiction 
and judges will often occupy dual roles. This has an impact on the cultural 
significance of social intervention through the criminal process.  
In England and Wales, since the Children Act 1989, the Family 
proceedings courts exercise jurisdiction over local authorities’ civil powers 
of supervision and control over young people (for example if the child is 
not receiving reasonable parental care or is beyond parental control).42 
The primary statutory aim of intervention is to address the interests and 
welfare needs of the children and young persons. Separate Youth courts 
now exercise an exclusively criminal jurisdiction with a statutory primary 
objective of preventing offending behaviour: engagement with welfare 
needs is defined as a means to that aim.43 This creates a very clear 
institutional division between criminal and civil intervention.44 In contrast, 
                                                     
40 At the time this would usually involve a detention and training order in a Young 
Offenders’ Institution, a Secure Training Centre or a Secure Training Home: for details 
see C Ball et al., Young Offenders: Law, Policy and Practice (2001, 2nd edn.) 
41 Pitts, op.cit., n 12 
42 The former gives the Local Authority parental responsibility and it may place the child 
away from home while the latter leaves the child at home but enables the LA to 
supervise them (Children Act 1989: S31).  
43 Though concern for welfare retains an independent statutory basis under the Children 
and Young Persons Act 1933: S44. 
44 In practice, during the period of research, Youth Offending Teams – the social workers 
working with the Youth Courts – felt that they were left to deal with many welfare issues 
because they had better funding than the youth social services working within the civil 
jurisdiction: see Field (2007) op.cit.  
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the institutional lines are less clearly drawn in Italy. It is not just that 
Youth justice magistrates may work across civil, administrative and 
criminal jurisdictions with judges being transferred between civil and 
criminal posts during their career: prosecutors actually have jurisdiction 
over both civil and criminal matters in the same case.45 Thus they can 
define an event as non-criminal but order that state intervention take 
place through social work supervision or control through the civil courts. 
Indeed often civil intervention will be quicker than waiting to put a messa 
alla prova in place because that would require waiting until the 
preliminary hearing (which might be a year away). Furthermore, Italian 
pre-trial judges can ensure civil interventions are taking place alongside 
preliminary criminal investigations. In responding to our vignettes in 
interviews, the difference in response that was noticeable was not so 
much that Italian magistrates would be more likely than Welsh police, 
prosecutors or magistrates to issue bare reprimands or pardons46 (though 
there were situations where that was true). Rather it was that where 
Italian judges saw problems - in the family background for example - the 
range of envisaged solutions included civil intervention.47 Indeed, civil 
intervention was not seen simply as an alternative to criminal 
proceedings: the two were seen as potentially working alongside each 
other. Thus in a vignette involving the young person selling the mother’s 
drugs where there were serious family problems alongside drug and 
alcohol consumption and truancy, an Assistant Prosecutor envisaged 
proceeding with the criminal prosecution (rinvio a giudizio) while at the 
same time launching civil proceedings.48 The Prosecutor did this 
anticipating that she might drop the criminal prosecution at the end of the 
day. The civil proceedings were seen as providing a complementary 
means of monitoring the young person’s development.49  
We need to bear in mind the practical constraints here on social 
intervention. Italian magistrates in interview stressed the limited number 
of both judicial and local authority social workers available to them.50 
                                                     
45 Proposals to separate more clearly civil and penal juvenile courts have not been 
adopted: thus the same judges may be acting in both civil and criminal roles : Int1/TJ, 
Int3/PTJ, Int4/PTJ, Int5/TJ, Int7/AP, Int9/AP. 
46 There are two main means for doing this. Irrelevenza del fatto is a measure whereby 
proceedings can be dropped for insufficient evidence or (more often) because the 
offence is insufficiently serious to warrant conviction). Perdono giudiziale (judicial 
pardon) is a formal penalty issued by a court (at the preliminary hearing or final 
hearing). It leaves a criminal record until 21 but nothing more: no fine to be paid nor 




50 Int4/PTJ, Int5/TJ 
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Gatti and Verde have argued sharp variations in trends in reporting 
offences to prosecutors are likely to be linked to the availability of non-
criminal disposals such as social service welfare interventions by local 
authorities.51 But judges saw intervention through civil proceedings in less 
serious cases either as an alternative to or something that might happen 
alongside a criminal case.52 Indeed such powers were the only option for 
children under 14 given that the age of penal responsibility in Italy starts 
at 14.53 
Thus, in trying to compare particular elements of intervention in the 
youth justice process, there are two linked potential difficulties: first, that 
the elements may not ‘map’ onto each other and the second, that the 
significance of each element to the overall system may be determined by 
its culturally distinct institutional contexts. Here, the meaning of different 
forms of social intervention through or around criminal justice is 
profoundly influenced by different ways of seeing the relationship 
between civil and criminal proceedings and the pre-trial and trial 
processes. This points to a challenge in adopting conventional social 
science approaches to comparison in criminal justice systems: the 
elements available for potential analysis and control may, on close 
examination, not be comparable. It may be difficult to find valid cross-
cultural anchoring points in cross-cultural research which will enable the 
construction of dependent and independent variables. For us, the contrast 
underpinning our research question between diversion and social 
intervention through criminal process in the community required a cross-
culturally valid way of distinguishing between diversion and intervention 
‘through’ criminal process. When closely examined within the context of 
the broader systems of which they are part, messa alla prova, misure 
cautelari and the blending of civil and criminal intervention did not seem 
to relate to our distinctions in the same way as the institutional 
mechanisms in England and Wales.  
 
 
YOUTH JUSTICE AS LEGAL CULTURE: TOWARDS HOLISTIC 
INTERPRETATIONS 
 
                                                     
51 Gatti and Verde, op. cit. (2002), pp. 307-8. 
52 Int3/ChP, Int8/AP, Int9/AP 
53 In contrast, with the implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, young 
people in England and Wales could be convicted of crimes from the age of 10 provided 
only that the courts are satisfied that they have the relevant mental element at the time 
of the offence 
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Another way of approaching comparative study in criminal justice is to 
regard its primary purpose as interpretive, as seeking to understand how 
legal actors come to think, feel and act as they do, and, to see the 
comparative understanding of difference and similarity in the light of that 
primary interpretive task. This is an approach often associated with 
comparing legal cultures.54 It implies a pervasive concern for how 
meaning is constructed and an emphasis on rendering explicit ways of 
seeing, thinking and acting that actors on the ground may take for 
granted. Indeed, the capacity of an outsider to see what an insider takes 
for granted is perhaps the most valuable consequence of comparative 
analysis. Our empirical materials - summaries of case-files and semi-
structured interviews – became a means to examine how cases and 
outcomes were differently constructed and categorised by actors on the 
ground.55 Integrating this with comparative analysis of legal and policy 
frameworks and broader social discourses around concepts like state, 
family, youth and crime, we were able to develop a rich description of the 
interplay between a range of cultural elements which reinforced the 
tendency towards intervention through criminal justice and conviction in 
England and Wales and away from it in Italy.56 It is important to 
emphasize this bringing together of a range of elements. Raymond 
Williams, a foremost pioneer of cultural analysis from the 1950s, 
described the theory of culture as ‘the study of relationships between 
elements in a whole way of life. The analysis of culture is the attempt to 
discover the nature of the organization which is the complex of these 
relationships.’57 More specifically, Webber has argued that the distinctive 
contribution of legal culture is ‘to focus on how diverse phenomena are 
interrelated, how they form an integrated whole, interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing’. 58 In previous work I have analysed these 
interdependent elements of youth justice cultures in terms of a schema of 
distinct cultural elements derived from Williams: intellectual formations, 
institutions, structures of feelings and traditions.59 Thus the political 
contexts, legal policy formations, distinct institutional interrelations 
between magistrates, police and social workers, between civil and 
                                                     
54 See D Nelken, op.cit (2010) chapter 3 for an examination of legal cultures and 
interpretation as a purpose in comparative analysis. 
55 For analysis of how files and cases and their categories may be actively constructed in 
legal process, see A Cicourel, Social Organization of Juvenile Justice (1968) and D 
Nelken, Limits of the Legal Process (183) 
56 For details see Field and Nelken (2007, 2010), op.cit. and Field (2010) op.cit. 
57 R Williams, The Long Revolution (1961) at 63. 
58 J Webber ‘Culture, Legal Culture and Legal Reasoning: a Comment on Nelken’ (2004) 
29 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 27 at 28. 
59 S Field, op.cit. (2010) 
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criminal jurisdiction and trial and pre-trial phases, could be analysed 
alongside broader social traditions and informal structures of feeling to 
explain the different meanings of intervention through criminal process in 
youth justice in the two jurisdictions. In this way we could explain how 
the different aspects of these criminal justice legal culture ‘resonate and 
fit together’.60 We were able to weave analysis of the professional 
ideologies of the Italian specialist professional youth justice magistrate 
and her supporting experts alongside consideration of her hierarchical 
powers of independent direction and control of the pre-trial process within 
the remains of the Italian inquisitorial tradition. We were able to place 
this within the broader contexts of civil society such as the family, religion 
and mass media. Interviews revealed that, in Italy, subject to only 
specific exceptions for immigrants, Gypsies and organized crime families, 
limited state intervention was underpinned by a general trust amongst 
youth justice practitioners for the Italian family and the strong informal 
social controls it exercised.61 The local Italian interpretation Catholicism is 
associated with de facto tolerance of wrongdoing where it is not 
associated with challenges to political or religious authority.62 The lack of 
a national tabloid press engaged in a fierce battle to preserve mass 
circulations combines with a concern for street crime that has been 
framed in terms of the challenges to Italian society of mass immigration 
rather than the loss of moral discipline amongst the working classes more 
generally.63  
We contrasted these interrelated elements with the very different 
relationships in England and Wales. These differences encompassed but 
went beyond differences in institutional relationships. We have noted the 
significance of the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by professional 
Italian magistrates who had chosen to work with young people and their 
hierarchical dominance of other actors within the system. We contrasted 
                                                     
60 D Nelken ‘The Uses of Legal Culture’ (2004) 29 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 
1 at 9. 
61 See Field and Nelken 2010, op.cit., n. 4 for views from the case-files and Int9/AP and 
Int10/SW for interviews. 
62 D Melossi, ‘Translating social control: reflections on the comparison of Italian and 
North American cultures concerning social control, with a few consequences for a 
“critical” criminology’ in Social Dynamics of Crime and Control, eds S. Karstedt and D. 
Kai (2000) 150 and ‘The Cultural Embeddedness of Social Control: Reflections on the 
Comparison of Italian and Northern American Cultures Concerning Punishment’ (2001) 5 
Theoretical Criminology  403. 
63 On the Italian media see R Lumley, Peculiarities of the Italian Newspaper, in Italian 
Cultural Studies: an Introduction, eds D. Forgacs and R. Lumley (1996), C Wagstaff  The 
Media in Cambridge Companion to Modern Italian Culture, edited by Z. Baranski and R. 
West (2001). On Italian attitudes towards street crime as a problem see Field and 
Nelken (2010), op. cit., 300  
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this political independence with the more pervasive influence of central 
government on the youth system in England and Wales using the 
techniques of new public management (essentially unknown in Italian 
youth justice). We also charted the way in which relationships between 
social workers, police and lay magistrates in England and Wales were 
much more negotiated than those in Italy (where the professional 
magistrate had clear power to direct police and social workers). But 
beyond these immediate institutional relationships we charted very 
different influences from civil society particularly very different attitudes 
to families and the influence of a tabloid press. In our interviews with 
Youth Justice Magistrates in Wales, they were more likely to see 
dysfunctional families as the characteristic background for those that 
appeared before them and to associate this with a loss of social authority 
and broader informal social controls within poor working-class 
communities. With wider distrust of families came a greater belief in the 
inevitability of greater recourse to state intervention. And behind this 
were images of a community - to whom local lay magistrates saw 
themselves as being in some sense responsible - whose presumed 
punitiveness was framed by the emotional images of the British tabloid 
press.  
Through these multiple and various layers of interpretation, we 
were able to set out the complex processes by which diversion made 
sense in an Italian setting in a way it did not in England and Wales.64 But 
what constraints follow from such a holistic interpretive approach to 
explaining difference? 
 
FROM INTERPRETATION TO EVALUATION AND PRESCRIPTION? 
 
What are the implications of doing this kind of research for making cross 
cultural value judgements about what is good and bad? One of the 
consequences of an interpretive research strategy is that the researcher 
invests an enormous amount of time and effort in understanding why and 
how actors think and act as they do, in asking how this works in its own 
terms. In the end we came to explain contrasting outcomes in terms of 
the ‘fit’ between diversion in Italy, formal intervention in England and 
Wales and a wide range of cultural elements in each jurisdiction. In turn, 
the difficulty that that creates is that, in building these complex accounts 
of a certain ‘cultural logic’, many external cross-cultural judgements begin 
to feel ‘wrong’ or ‘superficial’: they do not seem to acknowledge the way 
                                                     
64 For a clearer flavour of these layers of interpretation see Field and Nelken (2007), 
(2010) and Field (2012), op. cit. n 4 
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that outcomes are culturally accomplished, the range of cultural 
influences making one outcome likely and another unlikely. Thus 
judgements which pitted a ‘punitive’ system in England and Wales against 
an Italian system based on ‘benevolent tolerance’65 began to feel 
superficial because they underplayed the extent to which social 
intervention in criminal process is conditioned by how far it is written into 
institutionalized relationships. The system in Italy simply does not give 
you effective options for social intervention after conviction and it 
provides opportunities for social intervention without conviction that do 
not exist in England and Wales. These institutional relationships are not 
simply a consequence of a benevolent commitment to tolerance or 
leniency. They are in part the product of aspects of Italian justice that 
might not draw approval from external commentators such as very long 
trial delays, a consequent willingness to begin responding to presumed 
offending in the pre-trial process before conviction and a blurring of 
relations between civil and criminal intervention. Some of these would be 
widely thought undesirable in England and Wales and others, such as the 
appropriate relationship between civil and criminal jurisdictions, subject to 
ongoing debate.66 The argument for a clear division in England and Wales 
has stemmed from a certain mistrust of the state and a fear that 
confusion of punishment and welfare might lead to apparently paternalist 
welfare interventions that are a cloak for controlling or coercive 
interventions.67 Even the absence of a dominant figure like the Italian 
pre-trial youth justice magistrate is not an accident in England and Wales. 
The coordinate structure of lay magistrate, police and social workers in 
England and Wales is characteristic of a tradition in criminal justice 
amongst Anglo-saxon liberal adversarial jurisdictions.68 The absence of 
clear hierarchical relationships reflects the historic desire to divide and 
contain power and, once again, that distrust of the state. So these 
institutional relationships reflect enduring elements of (or debates within) 
British political culture and history. This is not to say that no British 
commentator could possibly wish to move in these directions but that 
they raise issues around legal accountability for the use of control and 
coercion that are matters of political culture, of values and choices to 
                                                     
65  J Muncie and B Goldson ‘States of Transition: Convergence and Diversity in 
International Youth Justice’ in Comparative Youth Justice eds. J Muncie and B Goldson B  
(2006) Sage Publications 197 at 209, 214. For a critique of the categorisation of Italy as 
tolerant or lenient, see D Nelken  'Italy: A lesson in tolerance?' in eds J Muncie and B 
Goldson, Comparative Youth Justice: Critical Issues (2006) and D Nelken ‘Italian Juvenile 
Justice: Tolerance, Leniency or Indulgence?’ (2006) 6 Youth Justice 107. 
66 J Fionda, Devils and Angels: Youth Policy and Crime (2005) 116-120. 
67 R Smith, Doing Justice to Young People (2011) 112-114. 
68 M Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority (1986). 
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which different societies may ultimately respond differently. The danger is 
that, without investing in close analysis of the cultural underpinnings of 
Italian youth justice, that British commentators may see desired 
outcomes very clearly but not quite all the contexts in which they are 
achieved.69  
What are the broader implications for policy prescription? How 
might this kind of comparative research help us to decide what is good or 
bad in youth justice? A fundamental value judgement underpins youth 
justice policy across diverse jurisdictions. How should we blend two 
distinct but related social objectives?70 First, there is the promoting of 
social integration (or the limiting of social exclusion) of children and 
young people. Secondly there is the preventing or reducing of youth 
crime. The distinction can be captured by two phrases: ‘children first, 
offenders second’ (which puts the accent on the first social objective and 
sees the second as flowing from that) and ‘governing through crime’ 
(where responding to crime becomes the dominant way of defining issues 
of social order).71 In essence these are fundamental political choices that 
turn on much broader questions than youth justice. What kind of society 
do we want? What kind of people are we? Comparative research can 
certainly illustrate the range of possible blends. But choosing between 
them seems to be as much about politics and identity as policy. Except 
insofar as the choice of blend may be shaped by a consequent question: 
how can you blend those two social objectives most effectively and 
efficiently? What works?  
If the relevant question becomes what works as a way of blending 
social integration with crime prevention or reduction, how can the kind of 
interpretive comparative research that we have conducted help us to 
‘learn from elsewhere’? Our research strategy emphasized the 
interpretation of meaning by actors. We explained and constructed the 
meaning of youth justice in our two jurisdictions in terms of a range of 
cultural elements (institutions, traditions and ways of thinking that 
embraced both complex intellectual formations and more improvised 
                                                     
69 See D Nelken, ‘Foil comparisons or foiled comparisons? Learning from Italian juvenile 
justice’ European Journal of Criminology (2015) 12 519 for a response to advocacy of 
Italian youth justice by the Howard League of Penal Reform.  
70 ‘Blend’ here refers to both prioritization and interrelationships. 
 
71 The phrase ‘Children First, Offenders Second’ was originally associated with the All 
Wales Youth Offending Strategy’ a joint document produced by the Youth Justice Board 
and the Welsh Assembly Government. The phrase is used to characterise the approach 
set out by Kevin Haines and Stephen Case for example in their book Positive Youth 
Justice: Children First, Offenders Second (2015). The term ‘governing through crime’ is 
associated with the book by J Simon Governing through Crime (2007) 
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structures of feeling). The focus was on making connections between a 
range of elements rather than isolating or controlling them as variables. 
Hence we have a potential problem. We can show how and why penal 
non-intervention fitted ‘youth justice culture’ in Italy. We can also set out 
a set of interrelationships which seemed to make it culturally possible, 
indeed perhaps logical, to avoid intervention, which gave cultural 
coherence to non-intervention as a response. But what does this tell us 
about its fit with other mixes of institutions, intellectual formation, 
structures of feeling and traditions? We have been able to produce 
plausible answers to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions in a particular cultural 
context but does this enable us to answer ‘what if’ questions? What if you 
transfer this or that element into a different cultural context?  
If one was looking to transplant criminal justice ideas from one 
place to another, formally constructed policies, procedures and 
institutions look like the most plausible bet. Transposing elements of the 
broader cultures of civil society – such as the Italian family – does not 
look like a viable policy option. Even transposing the institutions of civil 
society such as the mass media is not realistically within the power of 
most states interested in using comparative research to guide policy 
change. But even looking at institutional elements of criminal justice 
culture, this article has illustrated the problems of isolating particular 
elements to transfer (assuming you cannot transplant the whole system). 
Our research did not enable us to isolate the causal impact of particular 
cultural elements exactly because it explained outcomes in terms of their 
interrelations. If you take a cultural element out of its context how will 
that change its effect? If we say that we are trying to specify the cultural 
‘conditions of existence’ of the non-interventionist practices identified in 
Italian youth justice, then they seem not just multiple but inextricably 
interrelated such that understanding those conditions of existence may 
not permit us to isolate elements and their causal influence from the 
interrelationships of the whole. To put it in the language of quantitative 
research, it is not clear that one can isolate and control independent 
variables to examine their impact on a dependent variable.  
To those British observers thinking about institutional borrowings 
from Italy, one possible candidate might be career professional Italian 
judges and prosecutors who have chosen to work with young people, 
supported by child experts at hearings and a civil and criminal jurisdiction 
that is to some extent overlapping.72 But how would such actors have 
                                                     
72 For suggestions from British commentators that the separation of civil and criminal 
jurisdictions may be unhelpful, see J Fionda, Devils and Angels: Youth Policy and Crime 
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operated in the very different system of diversionary and penal 
mechanisms introduced by the ‘new’ youth justice? How would they relate 
to British families and work under the spotlight of the British media? It 
may be that the outcomes might be deemed positive by at least some 
observers but they would be very difficult to predict even on the basis of 
a very close observation of Italian youth justice culture. They might work, 
but they surely would not work in the same way. 
There is a well-known game called ‘Jenga’ in which one sets up a 
tower of wooden blocks and then tries to remove particular blocks without 
the tower itself falling. The game is about discovering which parts are 
essential to the integrity of the whole structure and which are not. In 
deciding whether (and how) to transplant particular institutional 
mechanisms from one criminal justice culture context to another, we are 
faced with an analogous challenge: we want to know what elements of 
the system under observation are dependent on what other elements to 
function effectively. Research based on comparative cultural 
interpretation, such as ours, does not easily allow such questions to be 
addressed exactly because the explanatory analysis depends on the 
interplay of cultural elements. But some hints may be found. For 
example, the distinctive institutional elements of Italian youth culture (its 
specialist youth justice magistrates, its mixed civil and criminal 
jurisdiction and its articulation of a particular kind of division of 
responsibility between family and state) is not sufficient to promote 
diversionary outcomes in certain circumstances. The children of 
immigrants, of Gypsies and of organised crime families are rarely 
beneficiaries of benevolent tolerance or even diversionary support. They 
are sent to prison in high and disproportionate numbers.73 Assumptions 
about the family of the offender – and in particular the capacity of the 
state to trust the family to socialise young people effectively - are 
essential to the diversionary orientation of the Italian system. If you pull 
that block out, the Jenga pile collapses. Changes over time can also give 
some hints of essential conditions of existence of particular youth justice 
cultures. For example, the ‘new’ youth justice culture of progressive 
intervention in England and Wales which appeared so solid over the 
period of our research did not survive the removal of three elements: the 
remodelling of central government targets, the loss of political visibility of 
                                                     
(2005) 120 and the Keynote speech by Kay LJ at Children Law UK Conference ‘Welfare 
and Justice’ (2003). Copy with the author.  
73 Gatti and Verdi op.cit. (2016) at 19-20 
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youth crime and a financial crisis in the means of state intervention.74 
Together these elements brought a changed relationship between the 
politics and the administration of youth justice. Youth crime and youth 
justice became less salient to central government policy. Greater 
independence of the administrative regulator (the Youth Justice Board) 
from direct political pressures enabled local diversionary initiatives to be 
encouraged. A degree of independence and agency was returned to social 
workers, many of whom had always retained doubts about the 
stigmatizing effects of formal progressive intervention through the 
criminal justice process based on early and systematic conviction and 
sentence.75 The combined effect has been to promote the rise of 
diversion, informal voluntary interventions without conviction and 
dramatic falls in formal convictions and custody rates.76 A relatively low 
key shift in political culture in England and Wales starting around 2007/8 
has resulted in a major shift in youth justice culture. This would not have 
been easily predictable from our interpretation of the interrelated culture 
which seemed to reinforce the trend to formal intervention. This 
reinforces the point made earlier: our kind of holistic analysis of cultures 
could make sense of the choices made within the system for formal 
intervention. But it could not easily predict what would happen if 





This account of a single empirical study based on bilateral comparison 
prompts certain reflections on different ways of doing comparative 
research and the relationship between explanation and policy prescription. 
I started with the argument that traditional social scientific approaches to 
cross-cultural analysis – if they can establish ‘scientific’ propositions about 
the variables that affect ‘what works’ in criminal justice – seem to offer a 
direct and clear route from comparative explanation to transnational 
prescription. But the evidence of this study suggests the challenges of 
doing the kind of research that might offer such straightforward policy 
prescriptions. It is rare for policy-makers to want to transpose an entire 
criminal justice system; they prefer to introduce only limited elements 
                                                     
74 R Smith ‘Reinventing Diversion’ (2014) 14 Youth Justice 109, T Batemen, ‘Trends in 
detected Youth Crime and Contemporary State Responses’ in Youth Crime and Justice ed 
B Goldson and J Muncie (2015, 2dn.) 
75 S Field (2007), op.cit., n 6 
76 T Bateman, The State of Youth Justice in 2017 (2017) 35-40, R Smith (2014), op.cit., 
n 74, K Haines and S Case ‘The Future of Youth Justice’ (2018) 18 Youth Justice 131 
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from elsewhere. Ideally, they want to be able to predict the effects of 
these elements in their new setting by isolating their impact from other 
variables in the original context. That becomes difficult if the element to 
be transposed – a legal actor or a penal measure for example – only has 
meaning (or has a very particular meaning) within the broader criminal 
justice culture within which it is anchored. One problem of borrowing from 
elsewhere is that some of these cultural contexts may not be obvious to 
the external eye. It may require close attention to cultural interpretation 
to reveal hidden difficulties in establishing cross-cultural common 
denominators of meaning. For a criminal justice researcher trained in 
England and Wales, only close reading of many transcripts of interviews 
and summaries of practitioner reasoning in case-files has revealed the 
distinctive ways in which Italian youth justice constructs its categories 
and draws its lines. Measures that initially look as if they might have 
direct comparators in one’s own jurisdiction – such as misure cautelari or 
messa alla prova – may look very different as one begins to grasp cultural 
contexts such as the relations between the pre-trial and trial phases and 
between civil and criminal jurisdictions.  
My argument is not that interpretive studies are a preferable form 
of comparative research to more traditional positivist explanations. Rather 
that interpretation should be seen as a kind of master-purpose for cross-
cultural research – where lack of cultural familiarity is a more frequent 
problem – upon which all explanation must depend. The key initial 
problem, in terms of conventional social science methods, is how to 
define the categories of data to be collected. Making these kinds of 
decisions is difficult unless we already have a good interpretive 
understanding of the places being compared.77  
This creates some tensions. It is not just that good interpretive 
research may sometimes reveal that apparently similar comparators are 
in fact not so suitable for traditional analysis. The broader demands of the 
two kinds of analysis may be in tension with each other. A wide range of 
sites may be important to studies where one is seeking to exploit natural 
variation across a number of cases to explore causal variables. Yet 
interpretive explanation depends on the researcher having or developing 
a cultural and linguistic fluency in the investigated locations. That tends to 
limit the range of possible research sites. The alternative, a large research 
team with diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds raises other 
problems of achieving common understandings.78 Furthermore, for these 
                                                     
77  D Nelken, op.cit. (2010) (chapter 2). n. 1 
78 See Edwards’ account in this volume of his use of the Delphi method to seek common 
cross-cultural understandings from a diverse range of participants.  
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more conventional comparisons of variable elements, the question of 
commensurability across comparators may become a limiting factor: 
there may need to be a certain amount of cultural proximity between the 
systems under comparison. Our difficulties in finding matching elements 
may have been less acute if we had studied places that were more 
similar. For example, youth justice in Wales might be – and sometimes is 
- compared with Northumbria to try to achieve a closer mix of cultural 
elements. One can imagine a different kind of quantitative study 
comparing parts of Italy. But that in turn loses some of the potential for 
innovative thinking that flows from ‘learning from elsewhere’  
 What is the use then of more radical comparisons based on building 
interpretative understandings of very different places such as the one 
conducted in this bilateral study?79 Here, the link between policy 
formation and comparative work may need to be seen in more indirect 
ways, as contributing to the range of possibilities that might be 
considered rather than demonstrating evidence of workable efficacy that 
can be transferred to different cultural contexts. If policy-makers are 
seeking the kind of certainty associated with a randomized controlled 
trial, comparative research is rarely going to give you anything like that 
unless the comparators are within the same jurisdiction or are 
jurisdictions that are remarkably close in most particulars. But that in turn 
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